To      : All Emergency Management Agencies
      From    : Wireless Institute Civil Emergency Network
                Australia
      Information for inclusion in this fortnightly Bulletin
      should be sent by one of the following methods :-

      Postal  : WICEN, P.O. Box 106, Mitcham, Victoria, 3132
      InterNet: vk3tp@csource.oz.au
      FidoNet : Paul Walton @ 3:632/404
      Packet  : vk3ur@vk3bbs.vic.aus.oc
      Voice   : Paul Walton (03) 754-8646 (A.H)


WICEN.044      MELBOURNE WITHOUT POWER/WATER  part 1/2    20/02/94


    The following article is edited from a paper presented to  the Annual
Combined Emergency Services Seminar held in Melbourne  last November, titled
"What If" by Alan Mearns of the Melb.Metropolitan Fire Brigade. It covers the
impacts likely to his organisation and the  community should Melbourne suffer
the loss of power and water for 3 days. This situation can easily occur during
earthquakes  as seen in the recent American emergency.

BACKGROUND:

    The MFB is responsible  for 1200 sq. kms. and  protects  about 2.5 million
people. There are 46 fire stations in that area manned by 300 full time 
firefighters. Their  primary role is to  protect the communities lives,
property  and  environment from the effects of fire, accident and other hazards
on a 24 hour basis.

    On a typical summers day they  attend over 100 emergency calls which would
include 30 - 40 grass and  scrub fires. Where  fire is involved they would save
lives and minimise property damage by the application of water. With a  major 
structure fire it may involve several hundreds of  thousands of litres of 
water. Safety  at the scene often relies on effective lighting. 

    Imagine a city with no lights. The buildings just dark  shapes and the
underground rail loop a dark empty chasm. We now  look  at some of the likely
outcomes of no power or water for 3 days.

                            POWER FAILURE

CUSTOMER SERVICE:

    The ability for the public to alert the Brigade via  telephone or automatic
alarm systems would be greatly reduced. Similarly the Brigade would have
difficulty in disseminating information via the usual media channels.

COMMUNICATIONS:

    The MFB has its own  Computer Aided Dispatch Centre located in Melbourne
which could survive due to their backup generator.  This would support their
radio comms., PABX and building  services. The Fire alarm Sending Equipment 
located in 32 of the  stations would revert to battery backup for 8 hours. This
could be extended to 24 hours, after which the FSE would fail and monitoring of
6300 alarm systems would fail.

    If the  blackout was  widespread it  could affect the 3  radio base station
sites. These  would  revert to  battery and require a generator to be installed
for continued operation.

    Telephones would revert  from the  Commander  system to normal phones and
would continue to function provided the Telecom  system was operational. Eds
Note : All  telephones do have diesel standby plant and so should remain 
operational  unless they have suffered from other damage ie. earthquake.

FIRE STATIONS:

    All  stations have  electrically  operated doors - these would have to be
manually operated. The  emergency  lighting  would last about 4-8 hours. The
ability to keep the vehicles on charge  would be lost. There  would be  the 
additional  problem of  maintaining their breathing apparatus as this requires
mains power.

MFB WORKSHOPS:

    The Government has guaranteed  that  priority be  given to the supply of a
standby diesel should it be required.

FIRE ALARMS SERVICES:

    These panels are required by Australian standards to be fitted with backup
power to provide for 24 hours without power. During an extended blackout these
automatic systems would  cease to operate.

    The  ramifications  of  the  loss  of all automatic fire alarm systems of
Melbourne could be quite horrendous. Particularly  in a high rise  complex or 
industrial  site  where a  fire could get a major  hold before the  Brigade was
 alerted. With no  reticulated water supply available and all electrical pumps
out of action such a situation would be devastating.    

MFB COMPUTER SYSTEMS:

    This would continue to operate under generator power.

FIREFIGHTING OPERATIONS:

    This would be difficult because of the inability of the public to notify
them of fires. Electrical fires would decrease but fires from people cooking on
open fires etc would increase.

    Responding to fires in high rise  buildings without lifts  and lights  or 
airhandling  systems  would  be unpleasant. This would test the fitness of the 
firefighters and  increase the time spent on the scene thus compounding the 
problem of  responding to other fires.

    Travelling to firecalls with the prospect of no traffic lights and no
street lighting would obviously  impact on  response times.

Part 2 deals with no water for 3 days........