Appendix V Memo on 6th and 16th Amendments Page V - 1 of 4 The Federal Zone: Reader's Notes: Page V - 2 of 4 Appendix V MEMO TO: Federal Zone Readers FROM: Mitch Modeleski DATE: March 1, 1992 SUBJECT: More on the 6th and 16th Amendments I have recently found an unusually clear and concise quote on the effect of a ratified 16th Amendment among some Appellate decisions I have been reviewing. This quote will be incorporated into chapter 5 of the second edition of The Federal Zone. After reading either edition, you will know the logic: if a ratified 16th Amendment had effect X, then a failed ratification proves that X did not happen. What is X? Answer: The constitutional limitation upon direct taxation was modified by the Sixteenth Amendment insofar as taxation of income was concerned, but the amendment was restricted to income, leaving in effect the limitation upon direct taxation of principal. [Richardson vs United States, 294 F.2d 593 (1961)] This ultra-clear ruling dovetails perfectly with the work of author Jeffrey A. Dickstein but, unfortunately, this case is not discussed in his book Judicial Tyranny (see the Bibliography). My 6th Amendment research has also merged perfectly with a parallel thesis of the book, namely, that the IRC should be declared null and void for vagueness. It turns out that there is a ton of legal precedent on the "nature and cause of the accusation". Our fundamental right to ignore vague and arbitrary laws is deeply rooted in our fundamental right to due process. Here's the tentative new paragraph for chapter 5: The "void for vagueness" doctrine is deeply rooted in our right to due process (under the Fifth Amendment) and our right to know the nature and cause of an accusation (under the Sixth Amendment). The latter right goes far beyond the contents of any criminal indictment. The right to know the nature and cause of an accusation starts with the statute which any defendant is accused of violating. A statute must be sufficiently specific and unambiguous in all its terms, in order to define and give adequate notice of the kind of conduct which it forbids. If it fails to indicate with reasonable certainty just what conduct the legislature Page V - 3 of 4 The Federal Zone: prohibits, a statute is necessarily void for uncertainty, or "void for vagueness" as it is usually phrased. Any prosecution which is based upon a vague statute must fail together with the statute itself. A vague criminal statute is unconstitutional for violating the 6th Amendment. With this mountain of court precedent, we can now attack U.S. vs Hicks as well as U.S. vs Bentson. The 9th Circuit kept referring to the importance of "explicit statutory requirements". Well, are those statutory requirements explicit if they utilize the key word "income" but don't even define it (because they can't without violating the Eisner prohibition)? Are they explicit if they define "State" in such a way as to create confusion about the precise limits of sovereign jurisdiction? Are they explicit if they qualify definitions by stating "where not otherwise manifestly incompatible with the intent thereof", but never define the intent thereof? Can we ever know the real intent of Congress, when Title 26 was never enacted into positive law? How can we know which of the 3 official definitions of "United States" to apply to the terms "United States citizen" and "United States resident" when the IRC doesn't tell us, precisely and unambiguously, which definition it is using? How can we ever expect to quiet the debate about "includes" and "including", when the Treasury Department's own decision, published in 1927, frankly admits that these terms have a long history of semantic confusion? "This word has received considerable discussion in opinions of the courts. It has been productive of much controversy." Their own published Treasury Decision proves that Title 26 contains terms that have a documented history of controversy and confusion. Page V - 4 of 4