Xref: nuchat talk.philosophy.misc:13970 sci.philosophy.meta:9219 rec.arts.books:76588 Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc,sci.philosophy.meta,rec.arts.books Path: nuchat!menudo.uh.edu!swrinde!cs.utexas.edu!uunet!newsflash.concordia.ca!mizar.cc.umanitoba.ca!feld From: feld@ccu.umanitoba.ca (Michael Feld) Subject: Re: The Categorical Imperative Message-ID: Sender: news@ccu.umanitoba.ca Nntp-Posting-Host: ccu.umanitoba.ca Organization: University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada References: <29ldl2$951@scunix2.harvard.edu> <29q583$kct@scunix2.harvard.edu> Distribution: inet Date: Mon, 18 Oct 1993 15:03:13 GMT Lines: 487 In article <29q583$kct@scunix2.harvard.edu> zeleny@husc7.harvard.edu (Mikhail Zeleny) writes: >In article >feld@ccu.umanitoba.ca (Michael Feld) writes: > >>In article <29ldl2$951@scunix2.harvard.edu> >>zeleny@husc7.harvard.edu (Mikhail Zeleny) writes: > >>>In article >>>feld@ccu.umanitoba.ca (Michael Feld) writes: > >>>>In article <2958d2$em7@scunix2.harvard.edu> >>>>zeleny@husc7.harvard.edu (Mikhail Zeleny) writes: > >>>>>In article >>>>>feld@ccu.umanitoba.ca (Michael Feld) writes: > >>>>>>In article <290jinf5@scunix2.harvard.edu> >>>>>>zeleny@husc7.harvard.edu (Mikhail Zeleny) writes: > >>>>>>>In article >>>>>>>feld@ccu.umanitoba.ca (Michael Feld) writes: > >MZ: >>>>>>>>>Are you perchance appealing to empirical considerations? > >MF: >>>>>>>>Yes > >MZ: >>>>>>>Not very (prima facie) Kantian of you, is it? > >MF: >>>>>>No,it's cool, I got special permission: to will something to be a >>>>>>universal law of nature presumes that one holds some views of/on >>>>>>nature; and those will be empirical. > >MZ: >>>>>Then, as I suggested earlier, your attempted rebuttal of my categorical >>>>>moral disqualification of homosexuality fails for the same reason you >>>>>might want to disqualify the legitimation of attempted murder through >>>>>the willing of making the human body bullet-proof. The moral: nature >>>>>being all of one piece, once you allow a foothold for natural law, you >>>>>lose the grounds for delineating the bounds of its applicability. > >MF: >>>>Have I permitted Natural Law to insert its nose into our tent? How >>>>wickedly sloppy of me; I'd meant only to admit nature: purpose-free, >>>>non-teleological nature. > >MZ: >>>My mistake, -- I meant to invoke the lowercase laws of nature. But >>>my point stands, inasmuch as the laws of nature are not transparent >>>to the awareness of a mundane, non-omniscient agent, except insofar >>>as their force may be consciously subsumed into the maxim of his >>>action. > >MF: >>>>>>>>>>To the meat of the matter, then: deontology without teleology. >>>>>>>>>>Aristotle shows the way. We simply as a matter of brute fact >>>>>>>>>>can (say the act deontologists) DETECT the wrongness of certain >>>>>>>>>>acts, and this without regard to our anticipation of their >>>>>>>>>>outcomes. > >MZ: >>>>>>>>>Brute facts, as in a posteriori? But you still owe me an account >>>>>>>>>of just what constitutes a certain act. Is it to be analyzed as >>>>>>>>>the willed bringing about of a certain event? if so, how do we >>>>>>>>>decide on the right description of the event in question? > >MF: >>>>>>>>Oh, fer sure: one man's suicide is another's temple-destabilization >>>>>>>>is another's freeing of the motherland. Where we disagree in our >>>>>>>>analysis of Kant (remember how this colloquy began?) is that you >>>>>>>>think that any (or, especially Kant's) picuring of an act >>>>>>>>deontologically must, to fix reference, involve teleology, and I >>>>>>>>a) do not; and b) would not see granting your point as leading to >>>>>>>>teleological ethics (though, to keep the record straight -- lord, >>>>>>>>forgive me that -- teleology suits me fine). What is wrong with >>>>>>>>universalizing lying is that the act wills both communication and >>>>>>>>its opposite; what is wrong with universalized homicide/murder is >>>>>>>>that it wills respect for others and wills their disrespect. That >>>>>>>>is, even if we identify forbidden acts by the teleological features >>>>>>>>of their essences (read the latest encyclical? not-quite-our-kind, >>>>>>>>eh?), it's not the teleology that forbids us those ends, for Kant, >>>>>>>>but the logical impossibility of having our cake and eating it, >>>>>>>>given, as you say, the brute facts of the world. As to Aristotle, >>>>>>>>adultery turns out simply to be wrong, hmn, trust him on that, and >>>>>>>>if you can't see his point, maybe you are colour-blind too. Of >>>>>>>>course, I buy none of this story, but continue to think it possible >>>>>>>>to do deontology sans teleology. > >MZ: >>>>>>>You are going to fast for me. Take the maxim authorizing a man to >>>>>>>feed his neighbor. Half an hour later, the neighbor turns blue and >>>>>>>drops dead. Feed him I did, as per the authorization of the maxim. >>>>>>>And "the brute facts of the world" that ensured the terminal outcome, >>>>>>>_pace_ Kant, must be irrelevant to the moral merit of my action. By >>>>>>>contrast, the logical possibility of willing through the maxim of our >>>>>>>action, as if it were a universal law of nature, is the determinant >>>>>>>of the said merit; and since all willing is determined by its final >>>>>>>cause, so is the moral determination. > >MF: >>>>>>Certainly, when we ask, "what maxims are universalizable?", we will >>>>>>encounter maxims specifiable only in terms of telos, of goals. Will >>>>>>all maxims be of this sort? If we forbid lying because it is >>>>>>self-contradictory if universalized, then we do not need to assume >>>>>>that communication (or happiness or whatever) is, or should be, a >>>>>>human goal. > >MZ: >>>>>Quite so. One man's prevarication is another man's reassurance. >>>>>Surely the issue of truth-telling need not be explicitly addressed in >>>>>each instance of verbal intercourse; and a thoroughgoing pragmatist >>>>>will be likely to forswear it altogether. > >MF: >>>>I wish I felt less apprehensive when I take it that you and I agree on >>>>some point; perhaps I fear the prosecutor's "aha! now I've got ya'". >>>>But since we do agree, why then please let me concede that you must be >>>>correct. > >MZ: >>>To recapitulate: we seem to be agreeing that the question "What >>>maxims are universalizable?", cannot be answered without essential >>>reference to the agent's specific goals. **** >>>In particular, if we are >>>to forbid lying because it is held to be self-contradictory if >>>universalized, then we indeed have to presuppose that cognitive >>>communication is, or should be, the primary goal of the speech act >>>in question; for it seems plausible that an entirely different >>>perspective will arise before an agent who intends his words to >>>function in a purely phatic or emotive fashion. > >MF: >>**** Oh dear me, no;no, this won't do; how reminiscent of all those >>evenings sitting at the feet of Mr. Chisholm, being told the story of >>intentionality. >>Trivially, we distinguish end-goals and proximate goals; ends, and >>means to ends. > >Fine; we seem to be agreeing that the question "What maxims are >universalizable?", cannot be answered without essential reference to >the agent's proximate goals. I trust that Mr Chisholm would be happy >with this formulation. Of course, as the above discussion will readily >confirm, I meant the salient teleology as comprised solely of proximate >goals, all along. The final cause of the willing is not the same as >the final cause of the agent doing the willing. > >MF: >>More significantly, though intentionality counts, that is in the sense >>that the philosophers of law understand it; viz., it encompasses >>purposing, acting knowingly, reckless action, negligent action. We >>can (and sometimes do, and perhaps should) issue such universalizable >>rules as "do not act recklessly". Here there is no speciification of >>goals, nor do we have to suppose that the agent whose acts we chide >>acted intentionally-in-the-sense-of-goal-seeking-purposely. Indeed, >>we chide her for not intending. > >I take it that reckless action is the same as action negligent of its >imminent consequences. Thus it would seem that Kant's rejection of >consequentialism in fact commits him to reckless action in this sense. >However, if your reckoning is meant to delve into the intrinsic nature >of the action itself, then why ever not? But of course in so enjoining >our agent to attend to his act, we force him to attend to its proximate >goals, which as we apparently agree, form part and parcel thereof. > We invite our agent to attend to what she is doing; to note that her actions have consequences. Need this be teleological in even a limited sense? I think not: e.g.., you scold someone for not keeping a promise. The wrongful act is deontological from non-beginning to non-end. [But let me add that my brow is dewed with regret that I seem to be playing into your hands.] >Also, in restricting ourselves to proximate goals, which inhere in all >intentional action, we ipso facto lose the ability to chide our agent >for acting unintendedly. So your maxim would have to be rephrased as >"do not act unreflectedly", which is to say "do not act without >attending to your goals". I rest my case. > Now I feel better: "without attending to your duties" will do very nicely, and significantly lacks intentionality. So there. >MF: >>>>>>Just as certainly, and willingly, I grant that when it comes to >>>>>>assessing human action, Kantians must make motive central, and >>>>>>to specify motive is normally to deal in goals. (Not always, >>>>>>though, or at least not in the ordinary Platonic sense of goal: >>>>>>"I did it because I thought it my duty, and I wished to duty my >>>>>>duty as such" might be an exception to that general principle.) >>>>>>Still, deontologists can and should distinguish the moral assessment >>>>>>of agents from the moral assessment of actions, and the fact that >>>>>>murdering one's mum-in-law (my own is super) is specifiable only >>>>>>in terms of goals (strychnine /beef) does not make, say, theft or >>>>>>adultery similarly teleological. Contract breaking is wrong, says >>>>>>Kant, not because its motive was ignoble, but because the act >>>>>>disrespected humanity. > >MZ: >>>>>Oops, wrong again! The breach of contract is impossible without prior >>>>>awareness of the contract, that is, without a proper intentional >>>>>orientation towards its content. I am reminded of Lorca's poem that >>>>>treats of the narrator schtupping another man's wife, who had >>>>>previously assured him that she was a virgin. (Personal anecdotes >>>>>will be furnished on request.) And similarly, the ascription of theft >>>>>presupposes a detailed sociohistorical construction of a possessive >>>>>individual identity, which ultimately relies on a teleological >>>>>constitution in terms of personal effort expended while alienating the >>>>>goods from the state of nature. In other words, something is yours >>>>>only because of somebody's purposive activity of separating it from >>>>>the realm of common goods; and moreover, your own entitlement to >>>>>property rights depends on and is limited by your need and ability to >>>>>use your property for the purposes mandated by the Fundamental Law of >>>>>Nature, or some such thing. Is that teleological enough, or would you >>>>>prefer me to go on? > >MF: >>>>Oh dear, yes, you must go on; for I'm far from happy with the easy >>>>assumption that contract is the source of property and/or property >>>>rights, and I strongly (strongly, sir!) reject what I take to be your >>>>suggestion that my signing a contract involves any commitment on my >>>>part, sincere or otherwise, to honour it. Of course, *I* do honour >>>>contracts, and I do respect property rights, as you'd expect from a >>>>Humean utility freak, but since OUR issue is whether one could indulge in >>>>non-teleological CI deontology, I might want to invoke, again, Kantian >>>>respect for others, or Aristotelean recognition that theft is always >>>>wrong, and skip entirely the notion of end-points. As to >>>>intentionality, ben sur, but only insofar as we regard the will to do >>>>what is rightly-specifiable-without-reference-to-endpoint-analysis. > >MZ: >>>May I remind you, Michael, that we are not talking about ourselves? >>>I do not have a theory of property, for the simple reason that I >>>find no natural evidence for property rights. But if we are to take >>>the injunction against theft seriously, we must avail ourselves of >>>some notion of property; for otherwise I could simply act upon a >>>maxim authorizing me to take any object accessible to me, thus most >>>naturally willing myself into the Hobbesian state of nature, without >>>having to pause to pay my respects to others. I take a *thing*; is >>>there any necessary reason why anyone else must be involved in my >>>taking of it, regardless of the brute facts of its physical location >>>in his proximity, and the social artefacts of the web of possessive >>>relations spun around it? As for Ari, unless you show otherwise, I >>>take it to be no more than an appeal to convention. > >MF: >>Of course I agree; when you are right, how could I do otherwise? But >>one of us (probably the Canadian) is losing touch with what this fight >>is about:I thought you were defending, and I attacking, the thesis that >>Kantian deontology, and perhaps deontology in general, pre-supposes >>some teleological analysis of goals-worth-seeking, or >>goals-being-sought. If that's what's at stake, then I don't see why I >>should not simply agree with what you've just said, but count myself >>unscathed. >>So, please, refresh (as we computer buffs say) me on the ISSUE. > >Well, I never claimed that deontology presupposes "some teleological >analysis of goals-worth-seeking", nor even of "goals-being-sought", >broadly construed; my thesis is that it must invoke and rely upon, a >description of intentions comprising the action, or proximate goals >in your parlance. > I'm beginning (that is to say, for some time now I've been beginning) to suspect that we/you have worked us into a non-issue. Are you saying more here than "action" =df "x, y, z, + intention"? >MF: >>>>>>>>Indulge me just this one indulge: cf the is/ought dispute. Your >>>>>>>>challenge to me that I specify an act without invoking telos seems >>>>>>>>parallel to the natural lawyers challenge that one specify natural >>>>>>>>regularities without reference to ends or functions or values; and >>>>>>>>is to be dealt with similarly. > >MZ: >>>>>>>Indulge me back: how do you specify the natural regularities in >>>>>>>human action, without recourse to human ends or human values? > >MF: >>>>>>By reference to what humans value; not in terms of what they ought >>>>>>to value (except in contexts of instrumental value). Alternatively, >>>>>>mechanistically, eschewing all teleological explanation ("synapse x >>>>>>fired, causing synapse ...). > >MZ: >>>>>But human identity depends on second-order values! (Compare the >>>>>aforementioned Harry Frankfurt.) And as regards your attempted covert >>>>>recapitulation of type-functionalism, the propensity for receiving >>>>>hairy forearms up the wazoo, evinced by Foucault and others, makes me >>>>>deeply skeptical about the possibility of establishing a nomological >>>>>correlation between synapses and values. > >MF: >>>>Damn, I'm losing track of what's at stake here. I know that you don't >>>>wish to commit me to supporting (or, I take it, condemning) Foucault's >>>>fundamental orientation, and that leaves me wondering why you invoke >>>>him. Circularly? Assuming that since he must be a baddy, it follows >>>>that mechanical explanations of human motivation must fail? But the >>>>establishing of such nomological connections simply IS empirical >>>>neuro-psychology; and in any case (and here I intend an ad hominem, go >>>>look it up (smile)), surely YOU don't want to explain ( >>>>/justify?forgive?) Foucault by supposing that genetics is all? > >MZ: >>>Please do not confuse me with the Campus Crusade Against >>>Fistfucking. The point is excruciatingly simple: until and unless >>>you demonstrate a salient distinction between Michel Foucault's >>>enthusiastically positive valuation of getting large objects jammed >>>up his arse, and a hapless Transylvanian aristocrat's resoundingly >>>negative valuation of a similar experience imposed upon him by Vlad >>>the Impaler, I propose that you abandon your quaint attempts to give >>>a neuro-psychological reduction of actual human values. In other >>>words, different strokes... > >MF: >>Now I've gotcha -- it's tens of thousands of *Turks* as gave Vlad his >>rep (which, by the way, is positive and high, among his compatriots). > >Eek! there I was, attempting to focus on Vlad's (not inconsiderable) >persecution of his own compatriots, so as to avoid the very mention of >a certain ethnicity and its associated religion, and now you ruin it >all with a single, emphatic word. Well, what the hell, -- given the >Lawrence of Arabia reports of the nearly universal rate of rectal VD >incidence among the captured Turkish soldiers, it may well be the case >that the average Turk would enjoy a bit of stake up his arse, too. So >please let me stick to my more civilized counterexample. > >MF: >>As to the challenge, what I said, and stand by saying, is that >>behaviour might best be explained by reference to neuropsychology, >>rather than by reference to beliefs and preferences; and if I'm right >>in this, then teleological explanation is stop-gap (mmmn), unneeded, >>faulty, anthropomorphic (mmmn again, forgive me, it's all your fault). > >Ah, but you are ever so wrong in this! Shall we proceed to bash >Dennett and the Churchlands, or will you grant me the artistic license >to remain on the side of such naive folk as Flaubert and Proust? To >preempt your objections, consider the following. > BASH the Churchlands? But Churchlands were us; Manitoba's philosophical claim to fame. And, alas, bashing them is out on doctrinal lines, as you'd have seen had you attended at Patty's Presidential address at the Pacific APA last Spring, instead of being so good a son: they are out of the closet non-eliminativists. >An alternative to accepting irreducibly semantic theories consists in >rejecting the fundamental hypothesis of semantics, that objects can >function as signs or symbols. Thus, according to Dennett, calling >something a symbol is a functional characterization of it, and >requires taking the "functional stance" toward it. Consequently, >Dennett does not believe that there exists any material or expressive >property, by virtue of which a thing (name-token) stands for its >referent. Naturally, this refractory position entails a wholesale >rejection of all claims of referential semantics, incidentally >including one's own theoretic entitlement to the notion of truth. > >Paul Churchland, in his latest book, has the right idea of this kind, >but even he ends up contradicting himself with his unfounded and hence >nugatory talk of certain fundamental "sensory coding". (As regards >Dennett, all his talk of "intentional stance", -- with respect to >what?, -- begs the question of intentionality of reference in a far >less subtle manner than Churchland's "sensory coding" jive.) As for >other varieties of reductive materialism, their dilemma is that either >the referential connection is construed as physical (Dennett says: >"not!"), that is, as material or immanently causal (and so itself >standing in need of a semantic analysis and explanation), or it is >construed as immaterial, that is, of the Third Realm. Neither option >is compatible with RM, EM, or, ultimately, even with the supervenience >theses. > >So either you now bite the bullet and claim that *all* reference and >*all* representation (including Churchland's "sensory coding") is but >a pernicious fiction, or you make an apologetic about-face, and >abandon materialism altogether. What will it be? > Nicely put, but not so very scary. Kim seems increasingly to have become an epiphenomenalist, [meaning] holism is at least on the ropes, and I suspect that when dusk falls, what most separates your position from mine is the Platonism/nominalism split, with nary an Aristotelean compromiser in sight. >MF: >>>>>>An aside: Kant sets a LOT of store by natural law, doesn't he? >>>>>>It's proper to castrate rapists because it's natural to, and the >>>>>>like. How NL is to tie to the CI lies in the province of the >>>>>>mystic, not the rationalist. > >MZ: >>>>>Generally speaking, I accept Henri Heine's claim about Manny's >>>>>motivation, -- he did it all to instill probity in his manservant. >>>>>But I remain convinced that certain fundamental insights can still >>>>>be salvaged on rational grounds. > >MF: >>>>Ah, well, to bolster one's case by invoking a Harry who German >>>>scholarship assures us never existed... > >MZ: >>>But for the resounding failure of German scholarship to have imposed >>>its rigorous standards of evidence on the refractory universe, sadly >>>unappreciative of the peerless Aryan genius, our memory of Harry >>>might not have persisted to this day. Then again, neither would we. > >MF: >>>>Suggestion: that we cease this particular chain. I've a Kantian >>>>historical puzzle, if you've a mind, that will more than compensate. > >MZ: >>>What, just as this starts getting interesting? > >MF: >>O, for young legs! > >Unless you were an extremely precocious youth, you are not quite old >enough to be my father. So kindly can your tiresome agist (it that >the proper PC term?) complaints. > A private message -- since no one else on earth could be persuaded to read this stuff, all our messages enjoy protection -- I'm quite old enough non-precociously, etc. [Old joke, which I invoke respectfully: "does your mom have a rose tattoed on her left shoulder?"] >>>In article >>>feld@ccu.umanitoba.ca (Michael Feld) writes: > >>>>In article <299f6l$2rf@scunix2.harvard.edu> >>>>zeleny@husc7.harvard.edu (Mikhail Zeleny) writes: > >MZ: >>>>>Look, Ma, no virtues! All I require is the traditional distinction >>>>>between perfect and imperfect duties, which is rightly regarded as a >>>>>legitimate one on the act-deontological approach. > >MF: >>>>Will you permit an aside? You know, I went and looked this one up in >>>>Kant, and damned if "imperfect duties" simply are not duties at all, >>>>but what Hohfeld called "privileges", and the rest of us call >>>>"liberties", which is to say, things that one is morally permitted to >>>>do, but has no moral obligation to do. Perhaps you might find a >>>>stouter reed to rest your argument on? > >MZ: >>>I think you got that slightly skewed. With all due respect to you >>>and Hohfeld, imperfect duties are supererogatory acts of goodness, >>>also known to our kind as mitzvot. Perhaps I should reiterate once >>>again: me no Kantian. Need I say more? > >MF: >>There you go again, agreeing at the top of your voice. I'm not sure >>we Humeans are permitted supererogation, but if Mom says ok, then for >>sure. > >It's a deal then? Are mitzvot permitted? > >MZ: >>>On second thought, here goes. An act-deontologist might feel the >>>urge to allow gradation of duty, in order to accomodate obligations >>>that cannot be attached to any particular act, but must nonetheless >>>be fulfilled in the course of a given lifetime. It seems to me that >>>Kantian imperfect duties must be treated in that way. For instance, >>>although there can be no act-specific perfect duty to help others >>>(as opposed to an act-specific duty of not harming them without good >>>cause), there may well be a perfect duty to lead one's life in a way >>>consistent with an active disposition to help others in an apposite >>>fashion. I guess that, notwithstanding my rejection of his theory >>>of property, I feel morally closer to Locke with his Fundamental Law >>>of Nature, than to the old Koenigsberg wanker himself. Now, for a >>>homework exercise, I leave you with an imperfect duty to apply the >>>same reasoning to the imperfect duty of self-continuation. > >MF: >>A valediction forbidding mourning. Your analysis just above cannot >>serve as a gloss of Kant, but that doesn't mean that you're wrong or >>that you're a bad fella. > >Your kind dispensation is hereby gratefully accepted. Do we now agree >on my interpretation of the CI, which is logically independent from my >views on imperfect duties, but does involve my notion of relevant >teleology? > Probably not, but why don't we leave that to the exegetes who will someday earn their bread deconstructing your earlyish career? -- Michael Feld | E-mail: Dept. of Philosophy | FAX: (204) 261-0021 University of Manitoba | Voice: (204) 474-9136 Winnipeg, MB, R3T 2M8, Canada