ANNOTATION SUPREME COURT'S VIEWS AS TO CIVIL LIABILITY OF JUDGES 55 L. Ed. 2d 850 TOTAL CLIENT-SERVICE LIBRARY(R) REFERENCES 15 Am Jur 2d, Civil Rights @ 269; 46 Am Jur 2d, Judges @@ 72 et seq. 10 Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), False Imprisonment, Form 123 42 USCS @ 1983 US L Ed Digest, Civil Rights @ 12.5; Judges @@ 14 et seq. ALR Digests, Civil Rights @ 1.3; Judges @@ 32 et seq. L Ed Index to Annos, Judges ALR Quick Index, Judges Federal Quick Index, Immunity from Prosecution; Judges -------------------- CONTENTS: To view a section or subsection, transmit p* and its number. Ex.,p*1 or p*1a To view the Table-of-Cases, transmit p*cases To view the Index (where available), transmit p*index @ 1. Introduction [a] Scope [b] Related matters @ 2. Summary @ 3. Judges of courts of general or superior jurisdiction [a] immunity for acts not done in "clear absence" of all jurisdiction over subject matter [b] --Effect of malice or corruption @ 4. Judges of courts of limited or inferior jurisdiction @ 5. Requirement of "judicial" act for immunity @ 6. Effect of Civil Rights Act of 1871 (42 USCS @ 1983) @ 7. Liability in particular cases [*1] Introduction [*1a] Scope This annotation collects and analyzes decisions of the United States Supreme Court in which the court has considered when, and to what extent, a judge n1 is subject to civil liability because of acts performed in his status as a judge. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - PAGE 3 55 L. Ed. 2d 850, *1a n1 For purposes of the annotation a "judge" is a public officer who conducts or presides over a court of justice. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - [*1b] Related matters Supreme Court's construction of Civil Rights Act of 1871 (42 USCS @ 1983) providing private right of action for violation of federal rights. 43 L Ed 2d 833. Liability in damages under 8 USCS @ 47 for conspiring to deprive a person of his civil rights. 95 L Ed 1261. Civil liability of judicial officer for malicious prosecution or abuse of process. 64 ALR3d 1251. Allowance of damages to successful plaintiff or relator in mandamus. 73 ALR2d 903. Libel and slander: findings, report, or the like of judge or person acting in judicial capacity as privileged. 42 ALR2d 825. --SUPP-- When is prosecutor entitled to absolute immunity from civil suit for damages under 42 USCS @ 1983: post-Imbler cases. 67 ALR Fed 640. Civil liability of witness in action under 42 USCS @ 1983 for deprivation of civil rights, based on testimony given at pretrial criminal proceeding. 94 ALR Fed 892. Manner or extent of trial judge's examination of witnesses in civil cases. 6 ALR4th 951. Applicability of judicial immunity to acts of clerk of court under state law. 34 ALR4th 1186. Sowle, Qualified immunity in Section 1983 Cases: The Unresolved Issues of the Conditions for its Use and the Burden of Persuasion. 55 Tulane L Rev 326, February, 1981. Auto-Cite(R): Cases and annotations referred to herein can be further researched through the Auto-Cite(R) computer-assisted research service. Use Auto-Cite to check citations for form, parallel references, prior and later history, and annotation references. [*2] Summary The general rule of common law, which the Supreme Court early recognized, is that judicial officers in general are not subject to civil liability for judicial acts done within their jurisdiction (@ 3[a], infra). In the several decisions of the Supreme Court involving a judge's immunity from civil liability on the basis of his status as a judge, the Supreme Court has drawn a distinction between judges of courts of general or superior jurisdiction and those who are PAGE 4 55 L. Ed. 2d 850, *2 judges of limited or inferior authority. The court has often recognized that judges of courts of general or superior jurisdiction are not subject to liability in a civil action for judicial acts, even if done in excess of jurisdiction, so long as such judges have not acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction over the subject matter (@ 3[a], infra). Moreover, the court has clearly settled that the rule as to judges of courts of general jurisdiction is not subject to a qualification which would abrogate immunity in instances where a judge acted maliciously or corruptly (@ 3[b], infra). With respect to judges of courts of limited or inferior jurisdiction, on the other hand, the Supreme Court has indicated that judges of such authority are immunized from civil liability for their judicial conduct only when they act within their jurisdiction (@ 4, infra). Whether under the rule for judges of courts of general jurisdiction or under the rule for judges of courts of limited authority, a judge, in order to be entitled to immunity from civil liability must have acted in a "judicial" capacity (@ 5, infra); and, in regard to such "judicial" act requirement the court has indicated that the factors to be taken into account are twofold, involving consideration of, first, the nature of the act itself, and, second, the expectation of the parties (@ 5, infra). Of further note in regard to the immunity of judges from civil liability is the Supreme Court's holding that the judicial immunity principle is fully applicable in actions under @ 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (42 USCS @ 1983), which makes liable "every person" who, under color of state law, deprives another person of his civil rights. Thus far, in the several decisions in which it has determined the question of the immunity of particular judges from civil liability, the Supreme Court has found that under the facts and circumstances presented in those cases, which cases have involved actions against judges arising out of such matters as a judge's disbarment of an attorney and a judge's ordering sterilization of a minor, judges were immune from civil suits. [*3] Judges of courts of general or superior jurisdiction [*3a] immunity for acts not done in "clear absence" of all jurisdiction over subject matter That judicial officers in general are not subject to civil liability for judicial acts done within their jurisdiction was recognized by the Supreme Court long ago, n2 and such rule, which is the common-law rule, n3 remains viable as a general statement of law. Regarding judges of courts of general or superior jurisdiction, however, the court has subscribed to a broad rule of judicial immunity, recognizing that such a judge is not subject to liability in a civil action for his judicial acts, even if they are in excess of his jurisdiction, so long as he has not acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction over the subject matter. Randall v Brigham (1869) 74 US 523, 19 L Ed 285; Bradley v Fisher (1872) 80 US 335, 20 L Ed 646; Spalding v Vilas (1896) 161 US 483, 40 L Ed 780, 16 S Ct 631; Alzua v Johnson (1913) 231 US 106, 58 L Ed 142, 34 S Ct 27; Pierson v Ray (1967) 386 US 547, 18 L Ed 2d 288, 87 S Ct 1213; Stump v Sparkman (1978) 435 US 349, 55 L Ed 2d 331, 98 S Ct 1099, reh den (US) 56 L Ed 2d 795, PAGE 5 55 L. Ed. 2d 850, *3a 98 S Ct 2862. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - n2 Wilkes v Dinsman (1849) 48 US 89, 12 L Ed 618; Randall v Brigham (1869) 74 US 523, 19 L Ed 285. n3 Pierson v Ray (1967) 386 US 547, 18 L Ed 2d 288, 87 S Ct 1213; Imbler v Pachtman (1976) 424 US 409, 47 L Ed 2d 128, 96 S Ct 984. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Thus, in Bradley v Fisher (1872) 80 US 335, 20 L Ed 646, the Supreme Court, observing that it is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequence to himself, noted that judges of courts of superior or general jurisdiction are not liable to civil actions for their judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction. After explaining that such principle obtains in all countries where there is any well-ordered system of jurisprudence, that it has been the settled doctrine of the English courts for many centuries, and that it has never been denied in the courts of the United States, the court emphasized that the immunity granted to judges is not without limit, there being a distinction between acts done in excess of jurisdiction and acts performed in the clear absence of all jurisdiction over the subject matter. Specifically, the court pointed out that where there is clearly no jurisdiction over the subject-matter, any authority exercised is a usurped authority, and for the exercise of such authority, when the want of jurisdiction is known to the judge, no excuse is permissible, but that where jurisdiction over the subject-matter is invested by law in the judge, or in the court which he holds, the manner and extent to which the jurisdiction shall be exercised are generally as much questions for his determination as any other questions involved in the case, although upon the correctness of his determination in these particulars the validity of his judgments may depend. By way of illustration, the court stated that if a probate court, invested only with authority over wills and the settlement of estates of deceased persons, should proceed to try parties for public offenses, jurisdiction over the subject of offenses being entirely wanting in the court, and this being necessarily known to its judge, his commission would afford no protection to him in the exercise of the usurped authority, but if, on the other hand, a judge of a criminal court, invested with general criminal jurisdiction over offenses committed within a certain district, should hold a particular act to be a public offense, which is not by the law made an offense, and proceed to the arrest and trial of a party charged with such act, or should sentence a party convicted to a greater punishment than that authorized by the law upon its proper construction, no personal civil liability for such acts would attach to the judge, although those acts would be in excess of his jurisdiction. The court said that some of the most difficult and embarrassing questions which a judicial officer is called upon to consider and determine relate to his jurisdiction, or the manner in which the jurisdiction shall be exercised, and that the same principle of exemption from liability which obtains for errors committed in the ordinary prosecution of a suit, where there is jurisdiction of both subject and person, applies in cases of this kind, and for the same reasons. PAGE 6 55 L. Ed. 2d 850, *3a And noting that courts of superior or general jurisdiction are not liable in civil actions for their judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, in Stump v Sparkman (1978) 435 US 349, 55 L Ed 2d 331, 98 S Ct 1099, reh den (US) 56 L Ed 2d 795, 98 S Ct 2862, the Supreme Court explained that the necessary inquiry in determining whether a judge of such a court is immune from suit is whether at the time he took the challenged action he had jurisdiction over the subject matter before him. Saying that the scope of the judge's jurisdiction must be construed broadly where the issue is immunity from suit, the court explained that the judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority, but will be subject to liability only when he has acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. It was added that a judge of superior or general authority is absolutely immune from liability for his judicial acts even if his exercise of authority is flawed by the commission of grave procedural errors. --SUPP-- Judicial immunity from suits for money damages can be overcome in only two sets of circumstances, one of which is that judge is not immune for actions, though judicial in nature, taken in complete absence of all jurisdiction. Mireles v Waco (1991, US) 116 L Ed 2d 9, 112 S Ct 286. [*3b] --Effect of malice or corruption Although it was indicated in an early Supreme Court decision that the rule immunizing judges of courts of general or superior jurisdiction from civil liability for their judicial acts is subject to the possible qualification that the judge must not have acted maliciously or corruptly, the court has since expressly repudiated this language, and in the following cases recognized that the rule of judicial immunity prevails even when malice or corruption is alleged. Bradley v Fisher (1872) 80 US 335, 20 L Ed 646; Spalding v Vilas (1896) 161 US 483, 40 L Ed 780, 16 S Ct 631; Alzua v Johnson (1913) 231 US 106, 58 L Ed 142, 34 S Ct 27; Pierson v Ray (1967) 386 US 547, 18 L Ed 2d 288, 87 S Ct 1213; Stump v Sparkman (1978) 435 US 349, 55 L Ed 2d 331, 98 S Ct 1099, reh den (US) 56 L Ed 2d 795, 98 S Ct 2862. Thus, although it had been stated in Randall v Brigham (1869) 74 US 523, 19 L Ed 285, that judges of superior or general authority are not liable to civil actions for their judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, "unless, perhaps, when done maliciously or corruptly," the court in Bradley v Fisher (1872) 80 US 335, 20 L Ed 646, concluded that the quoted qualifying words were inserted only to insure that the rule was not phrased in terms broader than necessary for the case under consideration, that such qualifying words were not necessary to a correct statement of the law, and that judges of courts of superior or general jurisdiction are not liable to civil actions for their judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction and are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly. The court said that the exemption of such judges from civil liability cannot be affected by the motives with which their judicial acts are performed, noting that allegations of malicious or corrupt motives could always be made, and if motives could be inquired into, judges would be subjected to vexatious litigation, whether the motives had or had not any real existence. It was observed that against the consequences of erroneous or irregular action by judges, from whatever motives proceeding, the law has provided private parties PAGE 7 55 L. Ed. 2d 850, *3b with numerous remedies, such as proceedings for suspension or removal, but that if civil actions could be maintained against a judge because a losing party should see fit to allege that the acts of the judge were done with partiality, or that they were done maliciously or corruptly, the protection essential to judicial independence would be entirely swept away. In Pierson v Ray (1967) 386 US 547, 18 L Ed 2d 288, 87 S Ct 1213, the court observed that the immunity of judges from liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction applies even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly, since the doctrine exists not for the protection or benefit of a malicious or corrupt judge, but for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions with independence and without fear of consequences. It was said that a judge's errors may be corrected on appeal, but he should not have to fear that unsatisfied litigants may hound him with litigation charging malice or corruption. And it was said in Stump v Sparkman (1978) 435 US 349, 55 L Ed 2d 331, 98 S Ct 1099, reh den (US) 56 L Ed 2d 795, 98 S Ct 2862, that judges of courts of superior or general jurisdiction are not liable in civil actions for their judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction and are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly. Since it is only when such a judge has acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction that he loses this immunity, the court noted, a judge will not be subject to liability simply because the action he took was in error or was done maliciously. --SUPP-- Because judicial immunity from suits for money damages is immunity from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages, such immunity is not overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice, existence of which cannot be resolved without engaging in discovery or trial. Mireles v Waco (1991, US) 116 L Ed 2d 9, 112 S Ct 286. [*4] Judges of courts of limited or inferior jurisdiction In contrast to the rule regarding judges of courts of general or superior jurisdiction, discussed in @ 3[a], supra, the Supreme Court has said that judges of limited and inferior authority are immunized from civil liability for their judicial conduct only when they act within their jurisdiction. Thus, although noting that judges of superior or general authority are not subject to civil liability for their judicial acts, even where those acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, the court, in Randall v Brigham (1869) 74 US 523, 19 L Ed 285, subscribed to a different rule with respect to judges of limited and inferior authority, observing that such judges are protected from civil liability "only when they act within their jurisdiction." See also Alzua v Johnson (1913) 231 US 106, 58 L Ed 142, 34 S Ct 27, where, in rejecting the contention that a justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands should be held civilly liable for rendering a false judgment, in view of the existence of a statute insulating a "judge, justice of the peace, or assessor" from civil liability only with respect to "any judicial action or judgment rendered by him in good faith, and within the limits of his legal powers and jurisdiction," the court observed that the statute had in mind PAGE 8 55 L. Ed. 2d 850, *4 judges of inferior courts, "as to whom a different rule has been held to prevail." [*5] Requirement of "judicial" act for immunity It has been recognized in virtually every decision discussed in this annotation, expressly or by necessary implication, that in order for a judge to possess any sort of immunity from civil liability for his acts, the acts must be "judicial" in nature. In the following decision, the court elaborated upon this requirement of a "judicial" act. Thus, observing that it is only for acts performed in his "judicial" capacity that a judge is immune from civil liability, the court in Stump v Sparkman (1978) 435 US 349, 55 L Ed 2d 331, 98 S Ct 1099, reh den (US) 56 L Ed 2d 795, 98 S Ct 2862, explained that the factors determining whether an act by a judge is a "judicial" one relate first, to the nature of the act itself, that is, whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, and second, to the expectations of the parties, that is, whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity. --SUPP-- Because a state-court judge was acting in an administrative capacity when he demoted and discharged a female probation officer, the judge does not have absolute immunity from a damages suit, under 42 USCS @ 1983, in which the former probation officer alleges that the judge demoted and discharged her on account of her sex, in violation of the equal protection clause of the Federal Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment, for (1) although the judge's decisions at issue may have been important in providing the necessary conditions of a sound judicial adjudicative system, the decisions were not themselves judicial or adjudicative; (2) a judge who hires or fires a probation officer cannot be meaningfully distinguished from an executive branch official who is responsible for making such employment decisions; (3) the alleged influence on the quality of judicial decisions, by the threat of vexatious lawsuits by disgruntled ex-employees, in no way serves to distinguish judges from other public officials who hire and fire subordinates, and does not create a great enough danger to justify absolute immunity; and (4) it is not significant that, under the state's law, only a judge can hire or fire probation officers, for it would lift form over substance to conclude that, because the judge acted within the scope of his authority, such employment decisions are brought within the court's "jurisdiction," or converted into "judicial acts." Forrester v White (1988, US) 98 L Ed 2d 555, 108 S Ct 538. With respect to allegations that an official act of a defendant judge was the product of a corrupt conspiracy involving the bribery of the judge, private parties who corruptly conspire with a judge in connection with such conduct are acting under color of law, for purposes of 42 USCS @ 1983; it is of no consequence in this respect that the judge himself is immune from damages liability, for (1) immunity does not change the character of the judge's action or that of the judge's alleged coconspirators, and (2) the judge's immunity is dependent upon the challenged conduct being an official judicial act within the judge's statutory jurisdiction, broadly construed. National Collegiate Athletic Asso. v Tarkanian (1988, US) 102 L Ed 2d 469, 109 S Ct 454. PAGE 9 55 L. Ed. 2d 850, *5 Judicial immunity from suits for money damages can be overcome in only two sets of circumstances, one of which is that judge is not immune for nonjudicial actions, that is, for actions not taken in judge's judicial capacity; judge will not be deprived of immunity because action that judge took was in error or in excess of authority; accordingly, relevant inquiry is into nature and function of act, not act itself--that is, relevant inquiry is to look to particular act's relation to general function normally performed by judge; it is nature of act performed, not identity of actor who performed it, that informs court's analysis of judicial immunity. Mireles v Waco (1991, US) 116 L Ed 2d 9, 112 S Ct 286. [*6] Effect of Civil Rights Act of 1871 (42 USCS @ 1983) The Supreme Court has ruled that the rule of judicial immunity is applicable in actions under @ 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (42 USCS @ 1983), which makes liable "every person" who, under color of state law, deprives another person of his civil rights. Thus, in Pierson v Ray (1967) 386 US 547, 18 L Ed 2d 288, 87 S Ct 1213, the court said that it did not believe that the settled principle of law immunizing judges from liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction was abolished by 42 USCS @ 1983, noting that the legislative record gave no clear indication that Congress meant to abolish wholesale all common-law immunities. Observing that it had previously held that the immunity of legislators for acts within the legislative role was not abolished, the court explained that the immunity of judges for acts within the judicial role was equally well established, and that it was to be presumed that Congress would have specifically so provided had it wished to abolish the doctrine. To the same effect, as recognizing that the doctrine of judicial immunity is applicable in suits under @ 1983, is Stump v Sparkman (1978) 435 US 349, 55 L Ed 2d 331, 98 S Ct 1099, reh den (US) 56 L Ed 2d 795, 98 S Ct 2862. --SUPP-- Virginia Supreme Court and its members was held subject to suit under 42 USCS @ 1983 and to award of attorneys' fees under 42 USCS @ 1988 in its enforcement capacity as to prohibition against attorney advertising, but immune from suit and not subject to award of fees in its legislative capacity of promulgating Code of Professional Responsibility rule strictly prohibiting advertising of attorneys. Supreme Court of Virginia v Consumers Union of United States, Inc. (1980) 446 US 719, 64 L Ed 2d 641, 100 S Ct 1967. As also recognizing that doctrine of judicial immunity applies to 42 USCS @ 1983 suit for money damages, see Mireles v Waco (1991, US) 116 L Ed 2d 9, 112 S Ct 286. [*7] Liability in particular cases The Supreme Court has held that particular judges were immune from civil liability because of their status as judges under the facts and circumstances of the following cases. Explaining that judges of courts of superior or general authority are not liable to civil action for their judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, the Supreme Court, in Randall v Brigham (1869) PAGE 10 55 L. Ed. 2d 850, *7 74 US 523, 19 L Ed 285, held that a justice of the Superior Court of Massachusetts was immune from suit by an attorney who sued the judge for the judge's allegedly wrongful removal of the attorney from the Massachusetts bar. In support of its decision the Supreme Court noted that the Superior Court of Massachusetts was a court of general jurisdiction, empowered by statute to admit attorneys and counselors to practice in the courts of the state, and to remove them, "for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct," and that both the admission and the removal of attorneys are judicial acts. A justice of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia was not liable to answer for damages in an action brought by an attorney alleging that he had wrongfully been disbarred by the justice, held the Supreme Court, in Bradley v Fisher (1872) 80 US 335, 20 L Ed 646. Explaining that the attorney--who had been disbarred because of alleged threats of personal chastisement made to the presiding justice of the criminal court of the district as the justice was descending from the bench after a recess in a criminal trial in which the attorney was a defense counsel--had been removed from the rolls of the District's criminal court, not from the bar of the District's Supreme Court, and elucidating the rule of judicial immunity to be that a judge of a court of superior or general authority is not liable in a civil action for judicial acts within his jurisdiction, even when in excess of jurisdiction, and notwithstanding allegations that the judge acted maliciously or corruptly, the Supreme Court pointed out that the criminal court of the district, as a court of general criminal jurisdiction, had the power to strike the attorney's name from its rolls, and that although the justice had erred in not citing the attorney, before making an order striking the attorney's name, so that the attorney could show cause why the order should not be made and could make an explanation, defense, or apology, such erroneous manner in which jurisdiction was exercised, although it might have affected the validity of the act, did not make the justice's act any less a judicial act. It was held, in Alzua v Johnson (1913) 231 US 106, 58 L Ed 142, 34 S Ct 27, that the doctrine of immunity of judges from suit because of their judicial acts protected a justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands against a suit to recover damages upon the alleged grounds that, without jurisdiction, the judge entered a judgment against the plaintiff contrary to an order of the full court, made a false statement of fact in the opinion by which the full court ratified the change, and inserted in the opinion of the full court in a second suit various false statements, including one attributing to the first judgment an effect that it could not have in the circumstances--all with full knowledge and intent to injure the plaintiff. Having noted various difficulties as to the suit against the judge that were additional to the question of immunity, among others, that the justices of the Supreme Court of the Philippines had expressed the view that the statements in the former opinions at issue were right and had rejected the suggestion that they were deceived when they rendered the judgments, the court stated that the immunity of the justice from suit was the same as that of judges in the United States, which was established beyond dispute. The court also rejected a contention that the justice could be sued because of a statute insulating a "judge, justice of the peace, or assessor" from civil liability only with respect to "any judicial action or judgment rendered by him in good faith, and within the limits of his legal powers and jurisdiction," the court observing that the statute had in mind judges of inferior courts, "as to whom a different rule has been held to prevail." PAGE 11 55 L. Ed. 2d 850, *7 In Pierson v Ray (1967) 386 US 547, 18 L Ed 2d 288, 87 S Ct 1213, it was held that a Mississippi municipal police justice was immune from liability in an action for damages brought against him and others under the common law of false arrest and under @ 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (42 USCS @ 1983) by individuals whom the judge had convicted of violating a state breach-of-peace statute, such damage action having been brought when the individuals, on appeal from the municipal judge's decision, had been vindicated in regard to their convictions. Noting that the rule of immunity of judges from liability for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction applies even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly, the court pointed out that the record was barren of any proof or specific allegation that the judge played any role other than to adjudge the individuals guilty when their cases came before his court. Additionally, the court found that the rule of judicial immunity was not abolished by the civil rights statute under which the judge had been sued. Also, in Stump v Sparkman (1978) 435 US 349, 55 L Ed 2d 331, 98 S Ct 1099, reh den (US) 56 L Ed 2d 795, 98 S Ct 2862, it was held that a judge of the Circuit Court of DeKalb County, Indiana, a court of general jurisdiction, who had approved a mother's petition to have her "somewhat retarded" minor daughter sterilized, was immune from damages liability when sued a few years later by the daughter and her husband in a federal court action under 42 USCS @ 1983. Observing that judges of courts of superior or general jurisdiction are not liable in civil actions for their judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction and are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly, the court ruled that the judge was immune from damages liability under 42 USCS @ 1983, even if the approval of the sterilization petition was in error, since in view of the state court's broad general jurisdiction under state statutes, the judge had jurisdiction to act on the petition and did not act in the clear absence of all jurisdiction, there being no state statute or case law prohibiting the state court from considering sterilization petitions presented by the parents of minors, and neither any procedural errors which the judge might have committed nor the lack of a special statute which authorized his approval of the sterilization petition rendering him liable in damages. Moreover, the court determined that the judge's approval of the sterilization petition was a "judicial" act entitling him to immunity from liability, since even though the petition had not been given a docket number, had not been placed on file with the clerk's office, and had been approved in an ex parte proceeding without notice to the minor, without a hearing, and without the appointment of a guardian ad litem, nevertheless (1) the judge had performed the type of act normally performed only by judges, (2) he had acted in his capacity as a judge, and (3) it was only because of his position as a judge that the mother, on the advice of counsel, had submitted the petition to him for his approval, the informality with which the judge had proceeded not rendering his action nonjudicial so as to deprive him of his absolute immunity. --SUPP-- Even if county public defender's allegations are taken as true--that (1) after public defender failed to appear for initial call of state judge's morning calendar, judge ordered two police officers to seize public defender forcibly and with excessive force and to bring him into judge's courtroom, (2) officers, by means of unreasonable force and violence, removed public defender from another courtroom and brought him into judge's courtroom, and (3) judge knowingly approved and ratified each of offciers' acts--judge is immune from 42 USCS @ 1983 suit for money damages, because (1) judge's alleged actions were PAGE 12 55 L. Ed. 2d 850, *7 taken in his judicial capacity; and (2) even though judge acted in excess of his authority if he authorized and ratified officers' alleged use of excessive force, such action, taken in very aid of judge's jurisdiction over case, cannot be said to have been taken in absence of all jurisdiction. Mireles v Waco (1991, US) 116 L Ed 2d 9, 112 S Ct 286. [*cases] TABLE-OF-CASES CASES ARE IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER GROUPED BY JURISDICTION AND LEVEL OF COURT Sup Ct Wilkes v Dinsman (1849) 48 US 89, 12 L Ed 618: @ 3 Randall v Brigham (1869) 74 US 523, 19 L Ed 285: @@ 3, 4, 7 Bradley v Fisher (1872) 80 US 335, 20 L Ed 646: @@ 3, 7 Spalding v Vilas (1896) 161 US 483, 40 L Ed 780, 16 S Ct 631: @ 3 Alzua v Johnson (1913) 231 US 106, 58 L Ed 142, 34 S Ct 27: @@ 3, 4, 7 Pierson v Ray (1967) 386 US 547, 18 L Ed 2d 288, 87 S Ct 1213: @@ 3, 6, 7 Imbler v Pachtman (1976) 424 US 409, 47 L Ed 2d 128, 96 S Ct 984: @ 3 Stump v Sparkman (1978) 435 US 349, 55 L Ed 2d 331, 98 S Ct 1099: @@ 3, 5-7 Supreme Court of Virginia v Consumers Union of United States, Inc. (1980) 446 US 719, 64 L Ed 2d 641, 100 S Ct 1967: supp @ 6 Forrester v White (1988) 484 US 219, 98 L Ed 2d 555, 108 S Ct 538, 45 BNA FEP Cas 1112, 45 CCH EPD P 37627: supp @ 5 National Collegiate Athletic Assn. v Tarkanian (1988) 488 US 179, 102 L Ed 2d 469, 109 S Ct 454: supp @ 5 Mireles v Waco (1991, US) 116 L Ed 2d 9, 112 S Ct 286, 91 Daily Journal DAR 12907: supp @@ 3, 5-7