File: C:\LEGAL\CITES\596FS261 n2 Preliminarily, the Court notes that defendant Harry Connick.contends that this Court should decline, under the Younger branch.of the abstention doctrine, to rule on the constitutionality of.these statutes, because "virtually all of the plaintiffs in File: C:\LEGAL\CITES\55LD850 Because a state.court judge was acting in an administrative.capacity when he demoted and discharged a female probation officer,.the judge does not have absolute immunity from a damages suit,.under 42 USCS @ 1983, in which the former probation officer a File: C:\LEGAL\CITES\378US500 (2) As to knowledge that the Communist Party is involved in a.world Communist movement aimed at establishing a totalitarian.Communist dictatorship in countries throughout the world, Congress.made specific findings in the Subversive Activities Control A File: C:\LEGAL\CITES\929F1552 ... Rindley sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as.damages, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. @ 1983 for the alleged violation of.his rights guaranteed under the first, fifth, and fourteenth.amendments to the Constitution. Specifically, Rindley sought File: C:\LEGAL\CITES\714FD184 n2 In their complaint plaintiffs also alleged that defendants.engaged in a conspiracy to infringe upon their civil rights in File: C:\LEGAL\CITES\743FD488 U.S.C..@@ 1983 and 1985 by appellees Judge Hosemann, Judge Dykes, Buzzy.Dykes, Thomas Weinberg, Kenneth McIntosh, and Alpine Dykes. .Specifically, she claimed that the appellees, individually, and as.part of a conspiracy, deprived her of custody of Aaron n6 On appeal, the appellants only argue that their rights to.procedural due process were violated by the appellees individually.and as part of a conspiracy, and have apparently abandoned their [2-5] The gravamen of Diana's complaint and her basis for appeal.is that her parental rights were terminated without notice and a.hearing by means of an official act of a judge, which was the.product of a corrupt conspiracy between the judge and the ot [6, 7] The "color of state law" component of @ 1983 may be.satisfied by showing that an official act of a defendant judge was.the product of a corrupt conspiracy involving the judge and other [8] Here, Diana alleges, and the other parties do not dispute,.that Diana was not given notice or a hearing before the dependency.adjudication deprived her of custody of Aaron. She also alleges.that the dependency adjudication was the product of a cor [16,17] However, Weinberg does not adequately address the.appellants' contention that Weinberg acted as part of a conspiracy.to deprive the appellants of their constitutional rights. To show.a conspiracy to violate @ 1983, the appellants must show tha summary judgment is inappropriate where the record, examined in......h)..........0*0*0*.........the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion shows any.material facts in dispute. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 90 S. Ct..at 1609. Weinberg's p The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Judge.Dykes because his actions constituted normal grandfatherly concern.rather than action under color of state law. However, as.previously discussed (see section IIA supra), the requisite eleme [18] The appellants have presented documentary evidence in the.form of Judge Dykes' notes both before and after the custody order,.from which inferences can be drawn that Judge Dykes was the.instigator of the dependency petition and the plan to regain. [19-21] As to Buzzy Dykes, the district court concluded that the.undisputed facts failed to show that Buzzy was a willful.participant in joint action with the other defendants. n11 To the.contrary, we find sufficient evidence that Buzzy participated i This section 1983 action arises as the result of a very.unfortunate dispute between an estranged husband and wife over the.custody of their child. If there are any cases where conclusory.allegations of conspiracy and wrongdoing are..................0 It is easy to sympathize with appellant Diana Dykes' plight.under the unusual facts of this case. There is little doubt that.Buzzy Dykes occupied a favorable position in litigating against.Diana in the Florida courts, due to Buzzy's father's position It is easy to sympathize with appellant Diana Dykes' plight.under the unusual facts of this case. There is little doubt that.Buzzy Dykes occupied a favorable position in litigating against.Diana in the Florida courts, due to Buzzy's father's position The grave implication of the Rankin decision is that, based on.conclusory allegations of conspiracy and prior agreements, judges In short, appellant's bald assertions that Weinberg was.participating in a conspiracy are met by undisputed facts which Appellant's only allegations as to McIntosh's participation in.the "conspiracy" is that he planned with Buzzy and Judge Dykes to.use the "illegal and improper" November 22nd custody order, which.he knew or should have known was illegal. Amended Compla McIntosh was retained by Buzzy and Judge Dykes around the end of.January, 1978, about two months after the disputed November 22,.1977, order had been entered. This order was facially valid; it.had never been appealed or held unlawful. McIntosh, repre It is unclear whether the district judge dismissed McIntosh for.failure to show state action, for for failure to state a claim. But it is clear that McIntosh can properly be dismissed for failure.to state a claim, since the complaint is totally devoid As was the situation with McIntosh, there are sufficient.allegations of cooperation between the Dykes' and the two state.agents in this case to satisfy the "under color of state law".requirement pursuant to Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 101 S. Ct..183 n8 If a prominent doctor, clergyman or industrialist in Brevard.County had telephoned Judge Hosemann in the same situation, and an.identical set of events had unfolded, it is doubtful that appellant.would have gone very far with her conspiracy claim. In sum, the possibility that Buzzy Dykes may have occupied a.favorable litigating position by virtue of his father's position as.a state court judge is insufficient to sustain a @ 1983 conspiracy In sum, the possibility that Buzzy Dykes may have occupied a.favorable litigating position by virtue of his father's position as.a state court judge is insufficient to sustain a @ 1983 conspiracy.claim against all parties involved in the original lawsu File: C:\LEGAL\CITES\466US522 A number of courts challenged the King's Bench for authority in.those days. Among these were the Council, the Star Chamber, the.Chancery, the Admiralty, and the ecclesiastical courts. Ibid .[***14] . In an effort to assert the supremacy of the commo n13 See also Queen v. Adamson, 1 Q. B. D. 201 (1875) (mandamus.issued to require justices of the peace to hear applications for a.summons to answer a charge of conspiracy to do grievous harm, where n15 See, e. g., Floyd and Barker, 12 Co. Rep. 23, 77 Eng. Rep..1305 (K. B. 1607) (criminal prosecution for conspiracy); Taaffe v. File: C:\LEGAL\CITES\561FS325 My feeling is that they are in a position to be charged as.principals in a criminal conspiracy to commit theft of public funds.by fraud committed on the Parish. The original scheme, of course,.dates back to 1934, but the conspiracy continues, even up On the morning of February 18, 1981, Perez presented the Motion.to Discharge the Grand Jury, which had been prepared for him by Mr..Andry, along with the Defley letter to Judge Leon. Judge Leon.signed the Order discharging the Special Grand Jury effec District Attorney Perez indeed filed these Bills of Information.charging Elliott and Defley with conspiracy to commit extortion on The Plaintiffs, James Elliott and Joseph E. Defley, Jr.,.subsequently filed suit on February 16, 1982, against Defendants,.Leander H. Perez, Jr., Frank Klein, and Eugene E. Leon, Jr., and.others seeking injuctive relief and damages for the alleged.viol Plaintiff, Joseph E. Defley, Jr., similarly alleges bad faith.and malicious prosecution on the part of the Defendants in causing.him to be wrongfully charged with conspiracy to commit extortion As to the allegation of bad faith malicious prosecution, Perez.filed the Bill of Information charging Elliott and Defley with.conspiracy to commit extortion shortly after the Special Grand Jury With regard to Perez's actions in filing the Bill of Information......h)..........0*0*0*.........against Elliott and Defley, charging conspiracy to commit [*1335] File: C:\LEGAL\CITES\680FD979 This appeal presents important questions concerning the scope of.relief available under 42 U.S.C. @ 1985(3), the extent of.congressional power to enact a civil remedy for wholly private.infringement of constitutional rights, and the relationship betwe intimidating, or destructive acts against employees at the.Alligator Bayou Pump Station project. Nearly two years later, the.plaintiffs amended their complaint, adding A.A. Cross Construction.Company, Inc., as plaintiff and the Sabine Area Building and.C No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue.a restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction upon the.ground that any of the persons participating or interested in a.labor dispute constitute or are engaged in an unlawful comb If two or more persons in any State or Territory cnspire or go.in disguise on the highway or on the premises of another, for the.purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or.class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or (3) one or more of the conspirators must commit some act in.furtherance of the conspiracy; whereby.. (4) another is either (a) injured in his person or property or The Griffin court, having concluded that the plaintiffs had.stated a cause of action under section 1985(3), then sought to.locate a source of congressional power to reach the private.conspiracy alleged. The sources identified in Griffin were the Griffin's principles indicate the plaintiffs here have made out.a cause of action under section 1985(3). The facts of this case.clearly embody four of the five elements essential to a successful.1985(3) claim. First, the evidence is sufficient to est unions and individual defendants. Second, proof that plaintiffs'.were assaulted, beaten, and threatened and that property was.destroyed establishes the requisite "act in furtherance" of the.conspiracy. Third, these acts are indisputably illegal apart fr rty damage, and economic loss. The only.element requiring analysis is the requirement that the conspiracy In Griffin, the Supreme Court stated that a 1985(3) conspiracy."must aim at a deprivation of the equal enjoyment of rights secured.by the law to all." 403 U.S. at 102, 91 S.Ct. at 1798, 29 L.Ed.2d.at 348. The plaintiffs in the case at bar contend that Griffin even considered and rejected the very explanation of.section 1985(3) which was later suggested in the Novotny.concurrence. In concluding that the first part of section 1985(3).reached all deprivations of the equal protection of the law,."whate The conspiracy in the case at bar sought to deny completely the.plaintiff employees' right not to associate. The district court.found that several truckloads of men assaulted the plaintiffs and."threatened to continue violent actons if the nonunion wo Plaintiffs are not a class normally afforded special protection.under the equal protection clause merely because they wish to work.nonunion. They are entitled to section 1985(3) protection only if.they are persons within the second category of protect n10 See, e.g., Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 72 (remarks of.Rep. Blair) (the Klansmen "murder for a difference in political.opinions"); id. at 333 (remarks of Rep. Hoar) (the Klan is a."secret political conspiracy"); id. at 392 (remarks of Rep. Although we find that Congress intended to classify these......h)!.........0*0*0*.........nonunion employees as entitled to use section 1985(3) that finding.does not resolve the question of whether their employer, which is.not a member of the class, ca The district court found that Cross Construction had been.injured by the attack on its Alligator Bayou worksite. There is no.dispute as to the fact of the corporation's injury or that it.resulted from the defendants' acts in furtherance of the.conspir Having determined that section 1985(3) was intended to provide.a civil remedy for the kind of conspiracy involved here, we must.respond to defendants' argument that Congress lacks the.constitutional power to enact legislation of this breadth. The.plai ......h)%.........0*0*0*......... The Griffin court concluded that the Thirteenth Amendment and.the constitutional right to interstate travel authorized Congress.to reach the private conspiracy alleged there. But the court The plaintiffs' 1985(3) action cannot be sustained under the.Thirteenth Amendment, for they are neither a racially oppressed.group nor suffering in the bonds of involuntary servitude. See,.e.g., Jones v. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409, 88 S.Ct. 2186, 20 L.Ed.2d l.power. Griffin clearly contemplated that other sources of.congressional power might be available to justify other.applications of section 1985(3).Indeed, the original proponents of.the Ku Klux Klan Act did not base their assertion of congressional.power By these standards, Congress acted within its constitutional.power when it enacted section 1985(3) to reach the private.conspiracy involved here. It cannot be denied that the aim of......h)).........0*0*0*.........protecting interstate commerce from u any controversy concerning terms and conditions of employment,.or concerning the association or representation of persons in.negotiating, fixing, maintaining, charging, or seeking to arrange.terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether or n One of the special abuses identified by Congress was the use of.vicarious liability doctrines under which the misconduct of a few.individuals could be attributed to the labor organization that.sponsored a strike or picket line. Courts had applied the c Congress recognized that this dragnet conspiracy approach to The unions finally urge that the evidence adduced at trial is.insufficient to support the judgment against them under any.standard of proof. After careful reviewing the entire record, we.agree that the evidence does not warrant the district court's.f Wallace had no further contact with the Alligator Bayou project.until January 17, 1975, when the attack occurred. On that day,.Wallace was present at the highway near the access road which led.to the Cross jobsite on at least two separate occasions.Mo Like Wallace, Hill himself gave a more innocent account of the.episode, and denied saying that he wanted the picture for the union.bulletin board.His explanation for seeking the photograph was, "I.don't know. I guess I am a camera freak. I like to ha In summary, we hold that (1) the anti.injunction provisions of.the Norris.LaGuardia Act do not deprive the district court of.jurisdiction to enjoin violence, and (2) Congress intended 42.U.S.C. @ 1985(3) to provide a remedy for private conspiracies.di Section 1985(3) provides that an injured party "may have an.action for the recovery of damages" "[i]f two or more persons . ... conspire . . . for the purpose of depriving . . . any person or.class of persons of the equal protection of the laws or of e If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go.in disguise on the highway or on the premises of another, for the.purpose of drpriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or.class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, o In Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 29.L.Ed.2d 338 (1971), the Supreme Court recognized that @ 1985(3) is.premised on a conspiracy to deny equality and is not a general.federal tort law. n15 To show that the conspiracy was designed The language requiring intent to deprive of equal protection, or.equal privileges and immunities, means that there must be some.racial, or perhaps otherwise class.based, invidiously.discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' action. The.conspiracy, This is the interpretation of @ 1985(3) that we adopted in.McClellan v. Mississippi Power & Light Co., 545 F.2d 919 (5th Cir..1977) (en banc). Turning first to what private action constitutes.a deprivation of the protection of the laws, we held that " Although @ 1985(3) reaches both public and private conspiracies.to deny constitutional equality, it is a non sequitur to conclude.that it, therefore, reaches all constitutional violations. The...statute is not designed to n34 Some courts have held that @ 1985(3) covers violations of.federal statutory rights. E.g., Hodgin v. Jefferson, 447 F.Supp..804 (D.Md. 1978) (claims based on @ 3 of the Equal Pay Act);.Broadcast Employees v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 419 F.S deprivation of."equal protection of the laws."" Life Ins. Co. of N. Am. v..Reichardt, 591 F.2d 499, 504-05 (9th Cir. 1979) (violation of.California's Civil Rights Act) (decided before Novotny ); Accord,.Harrison v. Brooks, 446 F.2d 404 (1st Cir. 1971) (zo The Supreme Court held in Griffin that the reach of @ 1985(3) is.limited by the requirement that the conspiracy be directed at a.denial of equality. Our colleagues state, however, that in Griffin."[t]he blacks brought an action under section 1985(3) t In Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan As'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366,.372, 99 S.Ct. 2345, 2349, 60 L.Ed.2d 957, 963 (1979), the Supreme.Court held that "[s]ection 1985(3) provides no substantive rights.itself; it merely provides a remedy for violation of the ri The extension of @ 1985(3) to protect against private.infringement of every right protected against governmental action.by the Constitution would create a Bivens. type tort action against.every private conspiracy that affects a federal constitutional Briscoe v. Bock, 540 F.2d 392 (8th Cir. 1976); Collins v..Bensinger, 374 F.Supp. 273 (N.D. Ill.) (recognizing that @ 1985(3).refers only to equal protection and not due process), aff'd mem.,.506 F.2d 1405 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1058, 9 Unlike Griffin, this case does not rest on the adequacy of.notice of pleading. The plaintiffs have had their day in court. .They proved no conspiracy to prevent them from seeking the equal protection of the laws, or to deny them that protection, or to class is protected by @ 1985(3). Slip op. page 15456, page 992.supra. Not only must the class share some common characteristic.beyond simply being the victims of a conspiracy, but it must also The majority rejects the view that Cross Construction is a.member of the protected class. n56 They manage to find a @ 1985(3).cause of action in favor of Cross Construction, however, by holding.that the statute extends a remedy to any person injured by n59 Novotny, a male, was a loan officer and member of the Savings and Loan Association's Board of Directors. He alleged that when he "expressed support for the female employees at a meeting of.the board of directors, his connection with the Associatio Although the power of Congress under the commerce clause is.broad enough to permit it to reach any private conspiracy designed The majority appears to assume that Congress intended to.authorize a remedy for any conspiracy that might affect interstate The majority holds that the existence of a conspiracy on the In my opinion, the phrase "equal privileges and immunities under.the laws" in the first clause of section 1985(3) refers to those.rights that the United States Constitution protects against interference by private action (as well as from impairment by In my opinion, the phrase "equal privileges and immunities under.the laws" in the first clause of section 1985(3) refers to those.rights that the United States Constitution protects against.interference by private action (as well as from impairment "It would be a mistake to read this legislative intent as.limited to direct interference with government provision of equal.protection. . . . The Ku Klux Klan was a political conspiracy; its "The Court's decision that the acts alleged in Griffin stated a.section 1985(c) cause of action accords with the original purpose.of the statute. The defendants in Griffin assaulted the plaintiffs.on the highway on the mistaken impression that the dri File: C:\LEGAL\CITES\776FD942 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 832, 105 S. Ct. 122, 83 L. Ed. 2d 64.(1984), affirming the dismissal of a claim against a court clerk,.we held th that judicial immunity would be assumed despite the.appellants' assertion that the court clerk and another defe n6 Appellants allege no substantive constitutional claims. As.the panel stressed, "appellants only argue that their rights to.procedural due process were violated by the appellees individually.and as a part of a conspiracy, and have apparently abandone n7 The "color of state law" component of section 1983 may be.satisfied by a showing that a judicial act of the defendant judge.resulted from a corrupt conspiracy involving the judge may be File: C:\LEGAL\CITES\783FD000 The panel opinion, which has been reinstated insofar as it.concerns the other appellants, discusses in only a cursory and.conclusory fashion the voluminous deposition [*1001] testimony.and other materials on which the district judge relied when he. Regarding appellee Weinberg, the panel opinion finds him not to.have addressed satisfactorily appellants' contention that Weinberg.acted as part of the alleged conspiracy. The majority observes that.he could be held liable on such a theory "if he reach Later, when a custody order had been entered by Judge Hosemann.vesting temporary custody in Buzzy, Diana spirited the child away.to Maryland. The meeting that is said in the panel opinion to.constitute evidence supporting appellants' allegations of a.c Regarding Judge Dykes, Buzzy's father, the panel observes that.the judge did some legal research and made some notes on the law.that might have been helpful to his son in petitioning for custody.or some other relief. The panel opinion then states that [*1002] Regarding Buzzy Dykes, the panel opinion observes that.Buzzy went to Weinberg and provided him with the information upon.which a dependency petition was sought; that he went to the judge.who had granted him custody of his son when Diana spiri Criminal conspiracy has been said to be the "darling of the File: C:\LEGAL\CITES\RESPONSE.DOC .........17. The undersigned Plaintiff/Appellant, Robert J. Chrispen,.would hereby respectfully submit that the subject matter "Motion To.Strike And Dismiss, Compel, Extend Time And Memorandum of Law," and.such certificate that there is good ground to su File: C:\LEGAL\CITES\744FS798 n1 Norton sues only Cobb and not her alleged co.conspirators..Because civil conspiracy is a tort with joint and several Several federal courts have interpreted Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 727,.86 S. Ct. at 1139-40, as allowing courts, in their discretion, to.dismiss, sua sponte, pendent state claims under certain factors. In.Sullivan v. Boettcher & Co., 714 F. Supp. 1132, 1133-3 In the motion to dismiss both the @@ 1983 and 1985 claims,.Defendant apparently attacks the Complaint as being too general and.insufficient to allege a conspiracy. n5. ..h)....Footnotes. . . . File: C:\LEGAL\CITES\318FD110 The Plaintiffs who have perfected their appeal to this Court as.Appellants are Dr. and Mrs. Richard Nesmith. Filling out the cast.of characters as Defendants.Appellees are Commissioner of Public.Affairs Sullivan, Chief of Police Ruppenthal, Desk Captai But two things complicate the problem for the trial judge. The.first is that there are some actions which, although not so as a.matter of law, might yet be found by the jury to be a violation of.Civil Rights. The second is that as to these (and also un One way of meeting this problem . although certainly not the.exclusive way .is to apply a "conspiracy" concept. Presumably that.is what the Plaintiffs did here. In the Plaintiffs' complaint and.in the pretrial order outlining the issues for the trial t For the reasons previously set out, the conspiracy theory was.not needed as to the initial false arrest and imprisonment; and, as.to that phase the retrial of the Civil Rights count will in effect.be limited to damages, compensatory and punitive. As to It cannot be questioned that the parties tried the case below.with full recognition that this is true. The pleadings of the.Nesmiths abound in charges that the officers were not acting in.good faith in what they did, but were carrying out a conspiracy File: C:\LEGAL\CITES\699FS64 Plaintiffs base their claims on 42 U.S.C. @ 1983 and @ 1985(3)..They seek a prospective injunction against Defendant Harding to.prevent his future interference with custody enforcement.proceedings. They also seek the return of Marc to Pennsylvania.basi Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for relief against the.Mormon Church. Plaintiffs' complaint is based upon 42 U.S.C. @ 1983.and 1985(3). To maintain a cause of action against the Morman.Church under either of these sections, plaintiffs must prov Plaintiffs' complaint contains numerous conclusory allegations that a conspiracy motivated by gender based animus existed between the defendants. The complaint, however, is totally lacking in any.form of factual support for these allegations. Broad and File: C:\LEGAL\CITES\430US651 In light of this history, it is not surprising to find that.every decision of this Court considering whether a punishment is."cruel and unusual" within the meaning of the Eighth and Fourteenth.Amendments has dealt with a criminal punishment. [*667] File: C:\LEGAL\CITES\USCS1983 Recovery of additional attorney fees for time spent establishing.original entitlement to attorney fees under 42 USCS @ 1988. 69 ALR.Fed 712. Action under 42 USCS @ 1985(1) for conspiracy to defame Civil rights action under 42 USCS @ 1983, @ 1985, and @ 1986 was not barred.by res judicata by Arkansas state court judgment affirming decision of county.civil service commission sustaining sheriff's decision to fire plaintiff.employee, where in civil Attorney appointed for successful civil rights plaintiff is awarded $.11,129.50 in attorney's fees plus $ 47.05 in costs under 42 USCS @ 1988 and.interest of 7.2 percent on award from date of order until paid under 28 USCS @.1961, where attorney's expe Section 1988 has been interpreted to provide for recovery of cost by.prevailing defendant when plaintiff maintains unfounded action in bad faith,.vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons; reasonableness of plaintiff's.claim must be assessed as Attorney fees under 42 USCS @ 1988 will not be awarded to city and police.chief who successfully defended against excessive force/failure to.train/conspiracy to deny liquor license claims of arrested tavern brawlers,.because claims were not frivolous a Attorney's fees, costs, and sanctions will be awarded in favor of landowners.and against developer, where developer filed @ 1983 suit against landowners.after they successfully petitioned to vacate public roadway providing access to.land developer plan Attorney's fees of $ 500.00, payable from bond which have been posted is to.be awarded to various federal, state, county and city officials to recompense.them for their legal costs in defending against action which was filed by.members of Life Science Nightclub operators are entitled to double attorney's fees under 42 USCS @.1988, where operators were successful in civil rights case involving conspiracy File: C:\LEGAL\CITES\694FD489 After a bench trial, the district court found that the McMahans.and the Loefflers had committed a tort under the common law of.Wisconsin by interfering with Kenneth Lloyd's custody of Carol. .The Loefflers' liability was based on conspiracy. Aware at abduction by the McMahans was too small to make them guilty of.conspiracy. This argument raises only an evidentiary issue, which It is true, as we observed in a recent case, that conspiracy has a somewhat anomalous status under tort law, since a tort, to be.actionable, requires that an injury actually be suffered, while.conspiracies are no less unlawful for being nipped in the b File: C:\LEGAL\CITES\759FD472 n2 Plaintiff's alleged that materials published by the State Bar.indicated a conspiracy by members of the State Bar to cause the File: C:\LEGAL\CITES\818FD411 n4 The plaintiffs also asserted claims for relief under 42.U.S.C. @@ 1981, 1985(2) and 1985(3) and joined several pendent.state claims. The district court treated separately the section.1985 claims, holding that based on the facts alleged in the.compla File: C:\LEGAL\CITES\395US752 "Plainly the case before us is essentially different from Marron.v. United States, 275 U.S. 192. There, officers executing a valid.search warrant for intoxicating liquors found and arrested one.Birdsall who in pursuance of a conspiracy was actually eng File: C:\LEGAL\CITES\460US325 Petitioners point to a number of references throughout the.debates on the 1871 Act to widespread perjury by Ku Klux Klan.witnesses in state criminal trials. n16 They urge that, because.perjury was one of the specific evils with which Congress was.conce n21 Compare id., at 317 (original version introduced by Rep..Shellabarger) with id., at 477-478 (more general language in.amended version); see id., at 567, 702 (Senate amendment adding.language punishing conspiracy for obstructing the due course of n22 It is noteworthy that the imposition of criminal liability.on persons for conspiracy to give false evidence was not in.derogation of the common law as it existed in 1871. Witnesses were.traditionally subject to a prosecution for perjury committed This [**1118] evidence does not, however, tend to show that.Congress intended to abrogate witness immunity in civil actions.under @ 1, which applied to wrongs committed "under color of . . ..law." The bill's proponents were exclusively concerned wi n7 The action for malicious prosecution grew out of the related.action for conspiracy. As early as 1293, various statutes were.enacted to aid persons who had been falsely and maliciously indicted or accused of crimes by conspiracy among the defendants File: C:\LEGAL\CITES\866FD121 Woodrum and his parents filed an initial complaint in August.1985 [**5] alleging violations of their civil rights under 42.U.S.C. @ 1985(3) and @ 1983. The complaint also contained pen-dent.state claims including allegations of intentional infliction The claims against Jayne Rosson primarily are allegations of.defamation under state law. A defamation claim was not pleaded in.the complaint. The district court dismissed with prejudice all.pendant state claims. The district court dismissed with prejud To prove conspiracy between Rosson and the social services employees under @ 1983, an agreement or meeting of minds to violate the Woodrums' constitutional rights must be shown. See Fonda v..Gray, 707 F.2d 435 (9th Cir. 1983). Rosson argued persuasivel File: C:\COPY\DOCU24.DSK conspiracy by members of the State Bar to cause the provisions of the Texas respect to conspiracy." The plaintiffs apparently do not appeal this part of the intentional infliction of emotional distress and conspiracy to deprive the dismissed with prejudice the state law conspiracy claims alleged in the first extent that Woodrum alleges that Rosson was part of a conspiracy to deprive the To prove conspiracy between Rosson and the social services employees under @ conspiracy. See Singer v. Wadman, 595 F.Supp. 188 (D. Utah 1982), aff'd, 745 F.2d 606 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1028 (1985) (conspiracy 631 (D. Cal. 1984) (allegations of conspiracy must be supported by material File: C:\COPY\DOCUCVRS.DSK intentional infliction of emotional distress and conspiracy to deprive the dismissed with prejudice the state law conspiracy claims alleged in the first extent that Woodrum alleges that Rosson was part of a conspiracy to deprive the To prove conspiracy between Rosson and the social services employees under @ conspiracy. See Singer v. Wadman, 595 F.Supp. 188 (D. Utah 1982), aff'd, 745 F.2d 606 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1028 (1985) (conspiracy 631 (D. Cal. 1984) (allegations of conspiracy must be supported by material conspiracy is a tort with joint and several liability, Plaintiff may sue one 1983 claim requires state action and the @ 1985 action requires a conspiracy), a conspiracy. n5 File: C:\COPY\DOCUPAY conspiracy was actually engaged in running a saloon. As an incident to the When is prosecutor entitled to absolute immunity from civil suit for damages under 42 USCS @ 1983: post-Imbler cases. 67 ALR Fed 640. Civil liability of witness in action under 42 USCS @ 1983 for deprivation of civil rights, based on testimony given at pretrial criminal proceeding. 94 ALR Fed 892. Sowle, Qualified immunity in Section 1983 Cases: The Unresolved Issues of the Conditions for its Use and the Burden of Persuasion. 55 Tulane L Rev 326, February, 1981. The court has often recognized that judges of courts of general or superior jurisdiction are not subject to liability in a civil action for judicial acts, even if done in excess of jurisdiction, so long as such judges have not acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction over the subject matter (@ 3[a], infra). Moreover, the court has clearly settled that the rule as to judges of courts of general jurisdiction is not subject to a qualification which would abrogate immunity in instances where a judge acted maliciously or corruptly (@ 3[b], infra). Of further note in regard to the immunity of judges from civil liability is the Supreme Court's holding that the judicial immunity principle is fully applicable in actions under @ 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (42 USCS @ 1983), which makes liable "every person" who, under color of state law, deprives another person of his civil rights. [*3] Judges of courts of general or superior jurisdiction [*3a] immunity for acts not done in "clear absence" of all jurisdiction over subject matter That judicial officers in general are not subject to civil liability for judicial acts done within their jurisdiction was recognized by the Supreme Court long ago, n2 and such rule, which is the common-law rule, n3 remains viable as a general statement of law. Regarding judges of courts of general or superior jurisdiction, however, the court has subscribed to a broad rule of judicial immunity, recognizing that such a judge is not subject to liability in a civil action for his judicial acts, even if they are in excess of his jurisdiction, so long as he has not acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction over the subject matter. Randall v Brigham (1869) 74 US 523, 19 L Ed 285; Bradley v Fisher (1872) 80 US 335, 20 L Ed 646; Spalding v Vilas (1896) 161 US 483, 40 L Ed 780, 16 S Ct 631; Alzua v Johnson (1913) 231 US 106, 58 L Ed 142, 34 S Ct 27; Pierson v Ray (1967) 386 US 547, 18 L Ed 2d 288, 87 S Ct 1213; Stump v Sparkman (1978) 435 US 349, 55 L Ed 2d 331, 98 S Ct 1099, reh den (US) 56 L Ed 2d 795, PAGE 5 55 L. Ed. 2d 850, *3a 98 S Ct 2862. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - n2 Wilkes v Dinsman (1849) 48 US 89, 12 L Ed 618; Randall v Brigham (1869) 74 US 523, 19 L Ed 285. n3 Pierson v Ray (1967) 386 US 547, 18 L Ed 2d 288, 87 S Ct 1213; Imbler v Pachtman (1976) 424 US 409, 47 L Ed 2d 128, 96 S Ct 984. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Thus, in Bradley v Fisher (1872) 80 US 335, 20 L Ed 646, the Supreme Court, observing that it is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequence to himself, noted that judges of courts of superior or general jurisdiction are not liable to civil actions for their judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction. After explaining that such principle obtains in all countries where there is any well-ordered system of jurisprudence, that it has been the settled doctrine of the English courts for many centuries, and that it has never been denied in the courts of the United States, the court emphasized that the immunity granted to judges is not without limit, there being a distinction between acts done in excess of jurisdiction and acts performed in the clear absence of all jurisdiction over the subject matter. Specifically, the court pointed out that where there is clearly no jurisdiction over the subject-matter, any authority exercised is a usurped authority, and for the exercise of such authority, when the want of jurisdiction is known to the judge, no excuse is permissible, but that where jurisdiction over the subject-matter is invested by law in the judge, or in the court which he holds, the manner and extent to which the jurisdiction shall be exercised are generally as much questions for his determination as any other questions involved in the case, although upon the correctness of his determination in these particulars the validity of his judgments may depend. By way of illustration, the court stated that if a probate court, invested only with authority over wills and the settlement of estates of deceased persons, should proceed to try parties for public offenses, jurisdiction over the subject of offenses being entirely wanting in the court, and this being necessarily known to its judge, his commission would afford no protection to him in the exercise of the usurped authority, but if, on the other hand, a judge of a criminal court, invested with general criminal jurisdiction over offenses committed within a certain district, should hold a particular act to be a public offense, which is not by the law made an offense, and proceed to the arrest and trial of a party charged with such act, or should sentence a party convicted to a greater punishment than that authorized by the law upon its proper construction, no personal civil liability for such acts would attach to the judge, although those acts would be in excess of his jurisdiction. The court said that some of the most difficult and embarrassing questions which a judicial officer is called upon to consider and determine relate to his jurisdiction, or the manner in which the jurisdiction shall be exercised, and that the same principle of exemption from liability which obtains for errors committed in the ordinary prosecution of a suit, where there is jurisdiction of both subject and person, applies in cases of this kind, and for the same reasons. With respect to allegations that an official act of a defendant judge was the product of a corrupt conspiracy involving the bribery of the judge, private parties who corruptly conspire with a judge in connection with such conduct are acting under color of law, for purposes of 42 USCS @ 1983; it is of no consequence in this respect that the judge himself is immune from damages liability, for (1) immunity does not change the character of the judge's action or that of the judge's alleged coconspirators, and (2) the judge's immunity is dependent upon the challenged conduct being an official judicial act within the judge's statutory jurisdiction, broadly construed. National Collegiate Athletic Asso. v Tarkanian (1988, US) 102 L Ed 2d 469, 109 S Ct 454. PAGE 9 55 L. Ed. 2d 850, *5 Judicial immunity from suits for money damages can be overcome in only two sets of circumstances, one of which is that judge is not immune for nonjudicial actions, that is, for actions not taken in judge's judicial capacity; judge will not be deprived of immunity because action that judge took was in error or in excess of authority; accordingly, relevant inquiry is into nature and function of act, not act itself--that is, relevant inquiry is to look to particular act's relation to general function normally performed by judge; it is nature of act performed, not identity of actor who performed it, that informs court's analysis of judicial immunity. Mireles v Waco (1991, US) 116 L Ed 2d 9, 112 S Ct 286.