The opening of Barbarossa saw the German Blitzkrieg at its finest. The
Soviet Union played right into this by deploying their forces in fixed
defensive posture, and much to their dismay they probably had more closely
followed French armored doctrine than they had Guderian and Fuller. It is
true that the Soviet armor was in many ways superior to the German. Many
of the Soviet tanks had heavier armor, bigger and more deadly guns, and
better cross country performance. They squandered this qualitative adv-
antage by adhering to a hopeless armour doctrine. The Soviet armor was
committed piecemeal, had no real coordination with other units, and
as Guderian has pointed out, lost many engagements in which they enjoyed
numerical superiority simply because they were driving the tanks into battle
mindlessly.

In this scenario, advance elements of Von Rundstedt's Army Group South
attempt to seize vital road junctions and terrain near Denpropetrovsk.

The Germans must move quickly - this battallion is to coordinate with
another battallion in the attempted crossing of the Dneiper. Time is of
the essence. You have 14 turns to sieze all the objectives.

Russians must simply hold on, mount counterattacks where advantageous, and
delay the Germans for as long as they can.